Sensationism and the moral sentiments: P.L. Roederer's reading of Smith's system of sympathy

This article contributes to a more balanced view of the French reception of the Theory of Moral Sentiments by looking at the interpretation favoured by de Grouchy‘s reviewer, Pierre-Louis Roederer. Most of such criticism, however, was directed specifically against Francis Hutcheson‘s conception of a moral sense, which in contrast to Smith‘s system of sympathy, had frequently been discussed by French authors. Any thoroughgoing sensationist thinker had to reject the idea of a preformed capacity for moral judgment. However, there remained room for a variety of opinion in sensationist accounts with regard to the question to what extent 'reflection‘ entered into the acquisition of sound moral judgment. However, in the Theory of Moral Sentiments Smith did in fact carefully distinguish sympathy from other forms of 'interpersonal identification‘ such as custom and fashion. The main significance of that earlier reading was not the subversion of Smith‘s ideas to serve as tools for political manipulation.