Abstract
We consider models for duopolistic competitive supply chain network designing with sequential acting and variable delivered prices. These models design a multi-tier chain operating in markets under deterministic price-depended demands and with a rival chain present. The existing rival chain tends to open some new retailers to recapture some income in a near future. These rival chains' structures are assumed to be set ''once and for all'' in a sequential manner but further price adjustments are possible.
This problem is modeled for each of the following two strategies: (1) the von Stackelberg strategy in which we assume the existing chain will choose its future entry sites in the way to optimize its market share. This problem is modeled by a linear binary bi-level program and solved by a combinatorial meta-heuristic. (2) the minimum regret strategy in which we assume the existing chain's future entry sites are totally unpredic, it is playing a ''game against nature''. This problem is modeled by linear binary programs.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 130-141 |
| Journal | Advances in Engineering Software |
| Volume | 42 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Apr 2011 |
Keywords
- Supply chain network design
- Stackelberg game
- Linear bi-level program
- Meta-heuristic
- minimum regret strategy
- game against nature
- multicriteria decision-making
- service competition
- demand uncertainty
- equilibrium-model
- facility location
- solution algorithm
- price
- inventory
- retailers
- optimization
- Business and management studies