The horizontal and the vertical: the significance of Levinas' phenomenological method

In this thesis, I examine the significance of Levinas’ phenomenological method between The Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology and Totality and Infinity. I argue that the phenomenological method, for Levinas, consists less in the reconstruction or analysis of Husserl’s texts than in the confrontation of the assumed consciousness in concrete life. On the basis of this interpretation of the phenomenological method, Totality and Infinity is read as the phenomenological reduction of the assumed consciousness in concrete life, which brings forth the philosopher’s necessary attendance in the act of philosophizing. I argue that Levinas’ reading of the Western tradition draws attention to the underestimation of the philosopher’s necessary attendance in concrete life and the lack of justification for the possibility of philosophy itself. Lastly, I argue that the phenomenological method brings forth another crucial problem with regard to the positional consciousness in concrete life. I apply the proposed interpretation of the phenomenological method to the philosopher’s inevitable movement on the horizontal; I argue that the significance of the movement on the horizontal has been dissimulated by the pursuit of the vertical, which means the pursuit of that which will remain the same when the next moment comes. The analysis of the philosopher’s movement on the horizontal in concrete life is not only a salient problem for philosophical reflections but also the beginning for other inquiries with regard to the proposed interpretation of the phenomenological method.